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One has only to turn on the television these days and see the awful grist that is offered
to the public in the guise of badly written situation comedies and dramas, not to men-
tion the proliferation of supposed news shows consisting of people shouting at each
other in stage-managed entertainment on sets with pictures of the U.S. Capitol in the
background. Surprisingly, one sees few historical dramas on television, unlike, for ex-
ample, in England, where the British Broadcasting Corporation routinely draws on
some episode in the country’s history to provide well-done and generally interesting
popular entertainment.
One cannot help but wonder why Max Boot did not try to write a historical
drama for television when he was working on The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars
and the Rise of American Power. Boot spends three-quarters of his book (nearly 300
pages) regaling the reader with stories of the courage and bravery of American heroes
across the centuries battling in distant lands in difªcult and trying circumstances, but
almost always triumphing against evil. Anyone interested in a dramatic and breathless
retelling of Stephen Decatur’s battles with the Barbary pirates, or Smedly Butler’s dar-
ing encounters with the Boxers in China and with South American rebels, or General
John J. Pershing’s dashes around Mexico in his unsuccessful attempt to catch Pancho
Villa will greatly enjoy reading this book. These and other incidents that chronicle
America’s “small wars” experience show Boot’s ºair for the dramatic. As retold by
Boot, in fact, these incidents probably would make for ªne television drama.
But Boot’s purpose in retelling these tales is decidedly not to impress the reader
with the drama of the country’s history. He seeks instead to demonstrate the relevance
of the country’s history to the modern era. Boot would have us believe that the U.S.
record in “small wars” around the globe over the centuries is part of a national experi-
ence and tradition that will allow the United States to play the role of a global
Robocop enforcing a Pax Americana in the new century. But Boot’s argument, though
interesting in itself, is built on a house of cards insofar as it involves his assertion of the
relevance of the U.S. historical experience to the modern era.
As an analytic tool, the drawing of inferences from historical case studies should
be a rigorous and painstaking process based on time-consuming research. Each case
study must be laboriously dissected to determine what actually happened and why in
a particular historical circumstance. Once this part of the equation has been com-
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pleted, the process of drawing inferences can credibly begin. Unfortunately, Boot did
none of the critical research, and thus the inferences he draws from his uncritical ren-
dition of history are essentially meaningless. All that emerges from the major part of
his book is a potted history of U.S. involvement in small wars. This makes most of the
book essentially unreviewable, except that Boot generally acknowledges in a back-
handed way that most of America’s episodic interventions around the world prior to
World War II had a negligible impact—a point that does not in fact support his main
argument. Sadly, Boot misses an opportunity for a genuinely interesting discussion of
why the wars of the modern era are fundamentally different from those of the last cen-
tury. A far more interesting example of the use of historical analogies to analyze the
modern era is Robert Kaplan’s wistful Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pa-
gan Ethos (New York: Random House, 2002).
The real point of Boot’s book is delivered in the remaining 100 pages, which treat
the reader to a politically motivated and inspired argument about why civilian leaders
should disregard the advice of professional military naysayers (who have often been
“wrong”) when making decisions about when to use force as an instrument of foreign
policy. Boot’s argument would probably have been more effective if it had been boiled
down to a 5,000-word article in Foreign Affairs (published by the Council on Foreign
Relations, where Boot is now a senior fellow) or an editorial in the The Wall Street
Journal (Boot’s former employer). Boot’s shopworn variation on the theme goes basi-
cally like this: The U.S. military has forgotten all the lessons it learned in the country’s
small wars (lessons enshrined in the “Small Wars Manual” of the U.S. Marine Corps),
and it blundered about in Vietnam and fought the wrong war against the wrong en-
emy while putting up with political interference—an experience that left it institu-
tionally scarred and forever reluctant to engage in any conºict short of all-out war.
The result was the so-called Weinberger/Powell doctrine, a doctrine ªrst formu-
lated in the mid-1980s by Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and then reªned at
the beginning of the 1990s by the then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin
Powell. Boot correctly notes that the prescriptions for the use of force under this doc-
trine were so narrowly deªned that it would almost never be used unless the country
came under direct attack or the Soviet Army came through the Fulda Gap. The cau-
tiousness of this doctrine is encapsulated, for Boot, in the 1991 Gulf War when Gen-
eral Powell’s reluctance to ªght the war, and to prosecute it fully once it started, al-
lowed the Iraqi army to escape with only minor damage and spurred George H. W.
Bush not to march on Baghdad. To avoid this regrettable outcome again, the task for
political leaders in the modern era, according to Boot, is to reassert civilian control
over the military and override the military’s reluctance to use force. The debate in
2002 and early 2003 over whether to use force against Iraq neatly captured all these
points, with the reported reluctance of the uniformed military (including some retired
generals) to invade Iraq contrasting with a more hawkish civilian leadership, especially
in the Department of Defense.
The more interesting issue implicitly raised but not explicitly discussed in The
Savage Wars of Peace is the fundamental differences between the “small wars” of the
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nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and those that followed World War II. The
fact is that the wars of the second half of the twentieth century involved new and more
sophisticated foes. Ho Chi Minh and Mao Zedong, for example, were Communist
revolutionaries who were fundamentally different from the enemies confronting the
United States in the nineteenth century. Their commitment to their respective strug-
gles was unshakable, their method of organizing and prosecuting war was different,
and they were prepared to pay essentially any cost to secure victory. Thus, it is not re-
ally so surprising that U.S. military and political institutions had difªculty adapting to
these new adversaries. Ho Chi Minh and Mao in some senses provided a bridge from
the post-colonial era to the new warrior caste and rogue states that are now identiªed
as the primary threats to the United States in the international system.
Osama bin Laden embodies the warrior caste of the new century. He is another
revolutionary leader who is waging an asymmetric war using new methods and an in-
novative organizational structure that draw on the latest private-sector thinking about
how to maximize the concepts of effective mass marketing, low overhead, operational
efªciency, and organizational effectiveness. The al Qaeda terrorist network is but the
latest—and perhaps most pernicious—example of the self-sustaining transnational
terrorist organizations that have sprung up over the past twenty-ªve years. These orga-
nizations simultaneously seek to make money, inºict casualties, and generally de-
stabilize whatever part of the international environment they happen to inhabit.
Combating these organizations is a central foreign policy challenge of the new century
that will, on occasion, require the use of force in addition to other more traditional
law enforcement techniques.
So how is the country to deal with this threat? Certainly the results of U.S. at-
tempts to disrupt al Qaeda’s base of operations in Afghanistan are encouraging and
suggest, contrary to Boot’s characterizations, that the American military may be better
at waging “small wars” in this era than is generally believed. Images of American sol-
diers on horseback calling in air strikes via mobile satellite communications using
Global Positioning System coordinates hardly suggest institutions that are unable to
adapt to a particular threat environment. The decision to go after al Qaeda under-
mines another of Boot’s assertions—that the so-called Powell doctrine continues to be
an operative set of assumptions. The terrorist attacks of September 2001 prompted
the country to respond decisively and quickly, with little concern over exit strategies or
other considerations enumerated in the doctrine. The country received a grave blow
from the attacks and went after the perpetrators in short order.
The role of force as an instrument of foreign policy in today’s chaotic interna-
tional environment is a fascinating topic. The United States is entering a new era with
unprecedented global dominance, and policymakers are still searching for a set of as-
sumptions to guide their decision-making on the role of force. We can be sure of one
thing: the future will not be like the past, and we are sailing into uncharted waters in a
new and unpredictable global environment that will require new frames of reference.
✣ ✣ ✣
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